Leonid Volkov at Miami University.
By August Hagemann
On February 27th, Miami University’s Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies hosted Leonid Volkov, a central figure in the Russian opposition, and Alexey Navalny’s chief of staff in his recent presidential campaign. Volkov gave his analysis on the present state of Russian politics as a member of the opposition, noting that while it is difficult to operate in Russia right now, there are signs of popular support for opposition ideas. Volkov was optimistic that this support will continue to grow, and that in the critical year 2024, when Putin will no longer be eligible for re-election (barring any constitutional changes in the meantime), the opposition could have a real chance at taking power.
Evidence of such a coming chance, according to Volkov, lies in the current turbulent political circumstances of the Putinist regime, as well as in the steadily growing opposition following. Volkov argued that Putin’s presidency has functioned essentially like a mafia — powerful elites, such as Ramzan Kadyrov and Alexei Miller, are allowed to act more or less with impunity, and when disputes arise between such power players, Putin is the ultimate arbitrator. However, Volkov notes that this system is inherently unstable, as it relies almost exclusively on Putin’s personal power and influence. If Putin leaves, then the system collapses. Though it may still be 5 years away, many elites are becoming nervous at the prospect that just such a collapse could occur in the wake of 2024, even if Putin’s successor is like him in nearly every respect, because it is the personality of Vladimir Putin rather than any codified regulations that hold the power structure together. With Putin’s current approval ratings at historic lows, it seems unlikely that someone even similar to Putin would have anything like a sure shot at being elected.
Volkov also considers the chances of Putin remaining in power unlikely. In order to do so, Putin could change the constitution, or hand-pick a successor who will hand power back to Putin again after a single term, but Volkov considers both of these scenarios unlikely; a constitutional referendum could very well be lost, and even the most loyal successor could get cold feet when the time comes to hand power back, as was the case with Medvedev. Volkov tackled the idea that Putin would change Russia’s government to be a more parliamentary system, but also considers this fairly implausible, as presidential power has a powerful symbolic and cultural value in Russia. Finally, Putin could attempt to revive and strengthen the formal union between Russia and Belarus, which could result in a new constitution, and a new presidency of a Russian-Belarusian Union, but this too is a distant hope, as even though Belarus is economically dependent on Russia, it is currently opposed to this idea of political union. In light of this impending collapse of Putinism, Russia’s political elites are engaged in a desperate struggle to “clean” their illegal assets and solidify their own power, in the event that whatever system comes after Putin is not as friendly to the way they currently maintain authority.
In contrast to this, Volkov argued that the Russian opposition movement has seen consistent and fairly rapid expansion over the last couple years. Navalny’s 2018 presidential campaign, in which Volkov served as his chief of staff, was the largest crowd-funded campaign in Russian history, raising roughly $6 million through micro-donations in the one year Navalny was allowed to campaign for. This campaign also involved visits to 62 cities, and 85 regional campaign offices staffed by more than 200,000 volunteers. Through these offices and other grassroots campaign strategies, Navalny was able to reach an audience of 4 million people. Volkov noted that this was still significantly less than the audience for state-run television — 20 million — but was confident that it represented a growing, vocal segment of the Russian population, willing to openly support an opposition candidate; a stand still dangerous in Russia, attested to by Volkov’s 7 arrests and 95 days in jail in 2017. 40 of these regional offices continue to operate, pursuing their own programming with the approval of the larger Navalny movement, and serving as unifying, organizational points for all variety of opposition movements in Russia. In addition to testifying to the possibility of a viable opposition movement, Volkov also argued that these offices refute the assumption that only Moscow and St. Petersburg care about politics. To Volkov, the involvement seen in these regional offices in the 2018 election and beyond testifies to a provincial Russia which cares and involves itself in the future of its country far more than many were previously willing to admit.
This strong opposition alone cannot topple the current Russian political order, however; Volkov envisions three possible scenarios whereby the democratic opposition could come to power. The first would be the unexpected death of Putin, which would immediately lead to a collapse in the system, and intense in-fighting amongst elites to maintain their power. This chaos would present a huge opportunity for the opposition to present itself as the rational alternative. The second scenario is what Volkov calls “the Black Swan” scenario. In this scenario, popular protests and uprisings occur on such a scale that Putin is forced to step down, similarly to what happened in some Middle Eastern and North African countries during the Arab Spring. Finally, Volkov believes the opposition could take power by using opportunities presented through internal struggles between political elites. As Putin’s power wanes, political elites are more and more frequently taking their disagreements public rather than allowing Putin to arbitrate. Volkov believes these could be used to de-legitimize the current regime, and lay bare its criminality for the whole Russian population to see.
The first two scenarios both rely on factors far outside the control of any political movement, which is why, Volkov says, the Russian opposition is currently focused on instigating the third. Regardless of what eventually may materialize, Volkov was insistent that when the time comes, if the democratic opposition continues to grow and stay organized, they will be elected, and will be the group to shape the future of Russian politics.
August Hagemann is a junior majoring in Russian, Eurasian, and East European Studies.