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<\/a>Confusion was common among those disseminating the messages, and was equally prominent among the recipients of agitprop. Dreeze\u2019s second point, that propaganda was \u201cirrelevant in content\u201d attests to the fact that the higher-ups did not know how to communicate effectively with those outside the major Soviet cities in Russia. Pointing again to Mukhamet Shayakhmeto, Dreeze explains that in Shayakhmeto\u2019s childhood, people read \u201cnewspapers one syllable at a time.\u201d Now, they were expected to \u201cunderstand\u2026empirio-criticism.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Riddled with unrealistic expectations, the Soviet \u201cpropaganda state\u201d did not spread information in an effective manner. In Kazakhstan, Dreeze explained how there appeared to be a stark disconnect between the Kazakhs and those in Moscow. He pointed out that, \u201cwhile Soviet leaders in Moscow\u2026worked to accommodate and incorporate Central Asia into its domain, it\u2026destroyed parts of\u2026Kazakh society.\u201d Seemingly stuck in an \u201cendless bureaucratic feedback loop,\u201d the Soviet state never made attempts to address problems plaguing the Kazakh people, thus, Dreeze argues, making propaganda \u201cirrelevant in content.\u201d After all, collectivization caused around \u201ca quarter of all Kazakhs in the Soviet Union\u201d to starve to death. Why should they try to decipher propaganda from the state that brought about destruction?<\/p>\n\n\n
<\/a>Similarly, on the frontlines of World War II, historian Roberto J. Carmack has argued in his article \u201cHistory and Hero-Making\u201d that the Red Army Political Division leadership had no data on the exact numbers of non-Russian soldiers and sergeants serving in the Red Army Agitprop workers could \u201conly guess as to how many\u2026propaganda materials to print in non-Russian languages.\u201d With an almost complete disregard for the people who were allegedly equal pieces in the Soviet puzzle, propaganda indeed appeared to be \u201cproblematic in form.\u201d In this way, Dreeze argued that the mechanics of delivering propaganda were more important than some of the content itself.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The historian Paula A. Michaels in her article \u201cMedical Propaganda and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Kazakhstan,\u201d shares the perspective of propaganda dissemination through untraditional methods: the spread of medicine. Promoting medicine and sanitation is a valiant cause; however, when put in the context of the USSR, it was a blatant attempt to exert influence. Strategically, the Soviet state sewed in Marxist theory to their rationale behind promoting hygiene, claiming that \u201cillnesses are connected with the workers\u2019 adverse living conditions under capitalism.\u201d By putting down the Kazakh way of life and promoting the Soviet \u201cnew man,\u201d new biomedical institutions, as Michaels concluded, brought \u201cSoviet power into the farthest corners of the USSR.\u201d <\/p>\n\n\n\n
In this light, it appears as though the Soviet Union truly is a propaganda state, intertwining new innovations with complex Marxist ideology, blaming the Kazakh’s relatively poor hygiene on capitalism. However, despite this attempt at promoting Soviet ideals, it did not succeed in the end. In fact, Michaels points out that many medical facilities were inaccessible, \u201cthus, even if health propaganda did reach Kazakh women and convince them of the benefits of biomedicine, they had little opportunity to avail themselves of any biomedical services.\u201d Seamlessly, this ties into Dreeze\u2019s argument that the most important aspect to propaganda dissemination were the mechanics. Without a centralized, systematic approach, propaganda can be rendered ineffective.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Despite the decentralized and poor efforts of Moscow to prioritize propaganda in Central Asia, Michaels argues that \u201cofficial propaganda nonetheless shaped the Kazakhs’ collective consciousness.\u201d Even during WWII, \u201ctroops identified strongly with the core messages disseminated by [the Red Army].\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Unrealistically, the USSR pursued a blanketed approach to propaganda, not accounting for individual differences between states. Dreeze pointed out that propaganda was not necessarily related to Kazakhstan, as many of the statements that contain \u201cKazakh\u201d or \u201cKazakhstan\u201d could<\/p>\n\n\n\n
easily be replaced with another nationality. While some may have been influenced, agitprop appeared to be relatively \u201cirrelevant in content,\u201d creating confusion and unattainable expectations for the effectiveness in disseminating. Or perhaps they were completely aware of this ineffectiveness but simply did not care about anything outside of populous cities. Highlighting this indifference towards small villages and towns, Dreeze argued that this inconsistency does not allow for the USSR to be considered a full propaganda state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There was a clear lack of effort when it came to propaganda in anywhere other than Russia. With such heavy emphasis on Russia and lack of anything else, can the USSR be classified as a propaganda state? Perhaps just the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic? Or perhaps not at all?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
By Grace Farrell OXFORD, OH, October 13, 2025 \u2014Is the narrative of a \u201cpropaganda state\u201d too russocentric? This past Monday, Dr. Jonathon Dreeze, the third speaker in the Havighurst Colloquium\u2019s fall lecture series, presented his research on Soviet propaganda in … Continue reading