{"id":1110,"date":"2020-05-15T08:33:33","date_gmt":"2020-05-15T12:33:33","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/?p=1110"},"modified":"2020-05-15T08:33:33","modified_gmt":"2020-05-15T12:33:33","slug":"russia-and-the-south-five-things-to-know-about-russias-relationship-with-the-middle-east-and-north-africa","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/2020\/05\/15\/russia-and-the-south-five-things-to-know-about-russias-relationship-with-the-middle-east-and-north-africa\/","title":{"rendered":"Russia and the South: Five Things to Know about Russia’s Relationship with the Middle East and North Africa"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

Note:  Students in Dr. Hannah\nChapman\u2019s Spring 2020 Havighurst Colloquium, \u201cRussia and the World,\u201d completed\nfinal projects where they assessed Russian relations with the West, East, North,\nand South.  This is the fourth and final\nproject, from students responsible for studying Russia and the South.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

By: Ziyong Liu, Blake Mullennix, Nancy\nPellegrino, Taylor Rathe, and Muriel Truax<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n

Introduction<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Analysts\nEugene Rumer and Andrew Weiss argue that the Middle East and North Africa\n(MENA) is arguably \u201c\u200bthe most\nimportant region of the world<\/a>\u200b, where the interests of many powers intersect: the United\nStates, the European Union, and even China.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unsurprisingly,\nRussia wants a say in this region. Russia has historical ties to MENA, but\ntoday the relationship is evolving. With the conflict in Syria and changes in\nAmerican foreign policy under the Trump Administration, Russia has an\nopportunity to achieve its goals in MENA.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Here\nare five major takeaways necessary to understanding Russia\u2019s relationship with\nthe Middle East and North Africa:<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1. Historical Involvement in MENA<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s\nintervention in MENA is not new. In fact, involvement in MENA has been\nprevalent throughout Russia\u2019s history, and its exit during the late-Soviet era\nwas the \u200bexception, not\nthe rule<\/a>\u200b.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\nthe 18th Century, Russia began creating ties with Middle Eastern countries to\ngain access to warm water ports, and in the 19th Century, Russia protected\nOrthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. After World War II, Russia courted\nnew Arab states and provided them with arms. In fact, Russia has consistently\nsold arms to MENA countries and is now the \u200bsecond<\/a>\nlargest global\narms exporter<\/a>\u200b.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Before scaling back ties with MENA countries in the 1980s\nand 1990s \u2014 due to military failures such as the \u200bFirst Chechen\nWar<\/a>\u200b\u2014\nSoviet involvement in the region was pervasive. In the 1970s, Russia had access\nto Egyptian support bases and \u201cfriendship agreements\u201d with Cairo and Damascus,\nas outlined in this \u200bEUISS<\/a> report<\/a>\u200b.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Today, Russia has returned their focus on MENA. Although\ntheir presence can be found in Israel and the Persian Gulf Arab states, the\nmost notable intervention is in Syria. Carengie Senior Fellow Eugene Rumer\nwrites that Russia has \u201c\u200bemerged<\/a>\u200b as a key power broker and military\nactor\u201d in MENA countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2. Russia\u2019s Involvement in the\nSyrian Civil War<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\ncollapse of the Soviet Union temporarily halted Russia\u2019s foreign policy\ncapabilities in the Middle East and North Africa. Throughout the early 2000s, Russian\nrelations with MENA countries remained relatively weak until the Syrian\nconflict. Their return to the region is seen as a \u200breturn to the\nnorm<\/a>\u200b for\ninternational politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia has made it a mission to ally itself with countries\nthat have been destabilized by US policy or that feel slighted by the West for\nnot adhering to their norms of governance. They thought the effects of the Arab\nSpring uprisings, which started in 2010 and spread across many Arab states,\ncreated a \u200bpower vacuum <\/a>\u200bthat provided Russia an opportunity\nto step in as a powerbroker and to address international terrorism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

With\nthe Kremlin\u2019s ties to the Assad family going back half a century, Russia has\nalso diplomatically and economically supported the Assad regime against the\nopposition since 2011. In 2015, the Kremlin \u200bescalated their involvement in the<\/a> Syrian Civil\nWar <\/a>\u200bthrough military\nintervention that continues to this day. Russia sees their role in the\nwar as a return to their great-power status operating at the crossroads of the\nworld and influencing the region\u2019s politics. Russia feels that having a say in\nthe future of Syria, and therefore, the stability of part of the region, will\nmake them an indispensable actor in the region\u2019s future, whose importance and\npolicy the West will have to recognize and cooperate with.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3.\nImplications of US Foreign Policy in MENA<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Historically,\nthe United States has had close connections with MENA countries. In fact, the\nU.S. Marines’ first overseas operation took part in North Africa, during the First\nBarbary War. Marines troops were deployed in North Africa and successfully\noccupied Tripoli.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nchanging of the United States\u2019 foreign policy has influenced Russia\u2019s influence\nin MENA as well. The U.S. and Kurds were traditionally allies, but after\nPresident Trump announced withdrawal from Syria in October 2019, most Kurds\nfelt betrayed and joined the Assad government\u2019s side. Even though U.S. Vice\nPresident Mike Pence announced that the U.S. and Kurds were still allies, the\nrelationship between the U.S. and Kurds is \u200bnot easy to\nfix.<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Since\nDonald Trump became president, his policies have worsened the U.S. and Iranian\nrelationship. On April 8th, 2019, the U.S. government designated the Iran\nIslamic revolution guards as a \u200bterrorist group<\/a>\u200b.On January 3rd, 2020, President Trump\nordered the \u200bassassination\nof Qasem Soleimani<\/a>\u200b, putting the U.S. and Iran at the edge of war. In the\nmeantime, more than 60% of Iran\u2019s weapons were provided by Russia, the United\nStates\u2019 behavior may push Iran into purchasing more weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Saudi\nArabia sees the United States\u2019 shale gas industry as a \u200bthreat to them<\/a>\u200b. \nIn 2020, many shale gas companies have \u200bdeclared\nbankruptcy<\/a>\u200b.\nSaudi Arabia and Russia agreed to decrease oil production, but the U.S. only\nagreed to\u200b decrease their<\/a>\nproduction<\/a>\n\u200bin exchange for a cease-fire of the oil war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Generally,\nthe United States\u2019 recent foreign policy in MENA has helped Russia increase\ntheir influence in MENA countries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

4. Economic and Energy<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Building\non the previous points of Russia reclaiming its historical ties and countering\nU.S. policies, Russia is trying to build its financial status in the MENA\nregion. As Russia searches for great power status, they have done so through diplomacy\nand military ventures thus far. But there\u2019s one thing that Russia is lagging\nbehind on \u2014 economics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

All\ngreat powers arguably have the financial resources as a tool. For Russia, whose\neconomy<\/a>\n\u200bis largely based on oil and gas, this provides some issues. They\nwant to invest economically in the region that houses\nsome of their biggest oil and gas competitors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But as they say, where there\u2019s a\nwill, there\u2019s a way. The United States\u2019 exit militarily from the region has\nopened up more opportunities for Russia to capitalize on. The Kremlin is\nproving their worth as they slowly make \u200binvestments\nacross the<\/a> region<\/a>\n\u200band particularly in the Gulf States. On oil, Russia\u2019s work with OPEC + has been able to shift oil prices into their favor.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

But\nlet\u2019s not forget Russia\u2019s \u200bmilitary\ninvestments<\/a>\u200b,\nwhich have been a consistent tool across the MENA region. Russian arms have\nprovided Russia not only with revenue, but also helps build diplomatic\nrelations and can be effective in conflicts. For Russia, the more buyers, the\nbetter <\/p>\n\n\n\n

While\nRussia\u2019s finances have been their Achilles\u2019 heel, they have been actively\nshowing their willingness to invest. In addition, \u200bCOVID-19 may\nhalt<\/a>\u200b these\nventures, but it shouldn\u2019t be surprising to see Russia trying once again to\nbring in more money.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

5. Diplomatic Opportunities<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\nits efforts to establish a role as peace-broker in the MENA region, Russia will\nneed to capitalize on its ties with Syria, as well as the opportunities for\nsecure diplomatic opportunities in the region. Until now, the Kremlin has\nassumed that order will emerge spontaneously \u200bas strong military and political leaders network<\/a> over shared\ninterests.<\/a> \u200bHowever, in order to achieve the goal of being a strong peace-broker, Russia will need to consolidate a strategy of active\ndiplomacy oriented toward diversifying relationships, presenting a\nnon-ideological approach, and showing long-term investment in Syria.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While\nthe U.S. has traditionally been interested in inspiring and sustaining Western\nliberal values such as democracy, Russia is more pragmatic — aiming instead at\nsecurity and stability. \u200bU.S. failures\nin MENA<\/a>\u200b,\nespecially in the Syrian Civil War provide an opportunity for Russia to contrast\nitself with the U.S. in the eyes of both the European Union and Syrian allies.\nRussia has strengthened its relationship with the Assad regime at the expense\nof the U.S. This will continue to be the case as long as Trump is in office.\nThe U.S. abandonment of its Kurdish allies has created a vacuum that Russia\nwill likely continue to fill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It\nremains to be seen what actions Putin ultimately will take. Partnering with the\nEU seems an efficacious strategy in bolstering Russia\u2019s diplomatic relations.\nThe fact that \u200bTrump’s\npresidency<\/a>\u200bhas\nresulted in a difficult relationship with the EU provides a vacuum for Russia\nto step in as a peace-broker between the EU and the MENA region. A shared\ninterest in thwarting terrorist activity is a valuable starting point for\nnegotiations. Furthermore, if Russia steps in to help the EU absorb the crisis\nof Syrian refugees, relations could be even better.
<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In\nRussia\u2019s quest for great power status in the world, the tools are all there. A\npower vacuum, oil and arms trade, and diplomatic opportunities provide ways for\nRussia to shine on the world stage. The question is whether Russia will be able\nto adjust its political methods for a post-Soviet era.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Russia\u2019s\nhistorical interactions in the MENA region reveal that there\u2019s more to the\nstory than is immediately obvious to the contemporary eye. Concern for ethnic\nand religious groups that Russia considers under its protection create strong\nbias in Russia\u2019s foreign policy attitude. Furthermore, with Putin not growing\nany younger, what will Russia’s next power transition look like?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The\nCOVID-19 pandemic and the upcoming 2020 presidential election in the U.S. are\nother factors that could drastically change Russia\u2019s assets and options\ninternationally. For the time being, Russia\u2019s MENA presence is a key stepping-stone\nin its rise as a major player on the international stage.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Note:  Students in Dr. Hannah Chapman\u2019s Spring 2020 Havighurst Colloquium, \u201cRussia and the World,\u201d completed final projects where they assessed Russian relations with the West, East, North, and South.  This is the fourth and final project, from students responsible for … Continue reading →<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":781,"featured_media":1112,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"gallery","meta":{"_bbp_topic_count":0,"_bbp_reply_count":0,"_bbp_total_topic_count":0,"_bbp_total_reply_count":0,"_bbp_voice_count":0,"_bbp_anonymous_reply_count":0,"_bbp_topic_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_reply_count_hidden":0,"_bbp_forum_subforum_count":0,"_s2mail":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[15,10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1110","post","type-post","status-publish","format-gallery","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-essays","category-russia-in-the-news","post_format-post-format-gallery"],"aioseo_notices":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1110","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/781"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1110"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1110\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1112"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1110"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1110"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/sites.miamioh.edu\/havighurst\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1110"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}